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ABSTRACT: This paper presents an empirical contribution to the identification of 
Grossman-Helpman’s “Protection for Sale” parameters model for Brazilian trade 
policy, based on robust estimations techniques, which means the use of instrumental 
variables in a 2SLS for Generalized Method of Moments and Limited Information 
Maximum Likelihood methods for weak instruments with corrections of size tests, 
in order to correct endogenous bias. The results suggest that the political economy of 
Brazil’s trade policy is an outlier in international comparisons, as the identification of 
structural parameters for Protection for Sale model shows a low part of population 
represented by an interest group and low weight of the welfare function.
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RESUMO: O presente trabalho é uma contribuição empírica para a identificação dos 
parâmetros do modelo “Protection for Sale” de Grossman e Helpman para a política 
comercial brasileira, baseado em técnicas de estimação robustas, o que significa o 
uso de variáveis instrumentais em um procedimento de Mínimos Quadrados em 
Dois Estágios (MQ2E) para o Método dos Momentos Generalizados (GMM) e o 
Método de Máxima Verossimilhança com Informação Limitada (FIML) para instru-
mentos fracos com correções dos tamanhos dos testes para a correção da tendência 
de endogamia. Os resultados mostram que a economia política da política comercial 
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brasileira é atípica em relação às comparações internacionais, pois a identificação 
dos parâmetros estruturais para o modelo de Proteção de Vendas mostra uma 
pequena parcela da população representada por um grupo de interesses e uma baixa 
ponderação da função de bem-estar social.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: processos políticos; busca de renda; lobbying; eleições; legis-
laturas e comportamento em votações; política comercial; organismos de comércio 
internacional; país; estudos especializados do comércio.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The literature on the Endogenous Trade Policy Theory reveals that the research object 
should not be only the economic system, but also the political influence of agents 
and coalition formation in political system. Therefore, the inference about optimal 
results extrapolated the scope of economic analysis. For Nelson (1988), the research 
agenda imposed the condition, in which, the decision making should be based on 
the structure of hypothesis on political system and in the interaction amongst gover-
nments and private agents, either represented by lobbies or not.
The Endogenous Trade Policy Theory has been an important role for economic 
literature, in response to the liberalization policies support and their endorsement by 
decision-makers. Also, it is observed tariff line specification depended on the results 
of two stage game involving internal that the agents, private agents against a incum-
bent govern, a and external agents, represented by discussions amongst trade part-
ners or members in an international forum.
The theory  would  be the result of the intellectual effort, from economists and 
political scientists, to explain the determination of the domestic protection levels. 
The endogenous approach has been promoted by the following observations: (i) the 
awareness of a disparity between the propositions held by economists about free trade 
and economic authorities’ practices; (ii) the lack of a relation to economic optimum 
and the political optimum; and, (iii) the existence of a political market where the 
protection level was negotiated and determined.
The literature of endogenous policy theory was an answer to the non-exogenous 
aspect in domestic protection’s level. So, in the eighties, it sourced a set of frameworks 
for endogenous protection to substitute the ad hoc models 70’s, namely:
a) Hillman (1982), Cassing, Hillman and van Long (1985), Hillman and 
Ursprung (1988), van Long and Vousden (1991), Brainard and Verdier 
(1994), Laphan and Ware (2001) and Hillman, van Long and Soubeyran 
(2001) derived a political support function that edged the policymakers 
trade actions constraints that causes welfare reduction;
b) Tariff formation function derived from Findlay and Wellisz (1983), Feenstra 
and Bhagwati (1983), Rodrik (1986), and Wellisz and Wilson (1986) that 
established a linear relationship amongst contributions from lobbies and 
tariffs;
c) Median elector model derived for Mayer (1984) suggested that the median 
elector chooses the level of protection;
d) Magee, Brock, and Young (1992) set up a campaign contributions model in a 
system composed by two opposed candidates and to economic sectors; and
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e) Grossman and Helpman (1994) derived the political contributions model, a 
parsimoniously framework from game theory in a first price menu auction 
under complete information, in which interest groups and incumbent 
government interaction results in a level of protection. Trade wars and 
trade talk’s model, in Grossman and Helpman (1995a), and free trade area, 
in Grossman and Helpman (1995b), sourced from PS Model.
So, for a small country, Grossman and Helpman (1994) established a single 
model, to determine endogenous trade protection through and parsimonious contri-
butions by organized and prominent sectors, named Protection for Sale model, PS 
model hereafter.
The framework is based on a two stage game amongst an incumbent govern-
ment and industrial sectors. The objective of incumbent government is maximize the 
govern function, which weighted political contributions from organized sectors and 
aggregated well-being. Through contributions, the sectors accessed the political deci-
sions on tariffs barriers. Empirical literature suggested the opposite relation between 
parts of government function. So, with the both parameters, namely, a weight of well-
-being function and proportion of organized population in interest groups deter-
mined the sectors protection levels.
In Brazil, events as record of tariff preference lists in the Latin American Associa-
tion of Integration (ALADI), in the beginning of 1994; the creation of lists of adequacy 
to the Common External Tariff (CET), in 1995; after the creation of the Southern 
Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), the creation of lists of exceptions to the CET; 
the creation of the Dallari’s list that was valid until April, 1995, (BACEN, 1996); the 
creation of an origin regime by the Common Market Council (CMC) (Decision 
Number 05/96); and the creation of the technical groups for strategic sectors, among 
other items, led to a study on the influence of the interest groups on the formation 
process of the protection structure for domestic industries. As period coincides with 
a preferential trade agreement, even harmonizing of tariffs, we use the small country 
model, as PS model, to the evidence of creation and collapse of MERCOSUR, as a 
main characteristic of interest groups pressure captured on parameters identification. 
So, as appointed by Baer, Cavalcanti e Silva (2002), the lobbying channel and risk 
channel from main partners, classified as absence of coordination of macroeconomic 
policies, contributed to the collapse of common market.
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Table 1 – Basic statistics of sectorial tariffs
SIC–31 Sector Average2 Standard deviation2
501 Basic Metallic Products 0,0431 0,0145
601 Non-ferrous Metallic Prod. 0,0947 0,0176
701 Other Metallic Products 0,1864 0,0321
802 Tractors and Agricultural Machines 0,2018 0,0410
1001 Electrical Equipment 0,2234 0,0412
1101 Electronic Equipment 0,2196 0,043-
1201 Cars, Trucks and Buses 0,4132 0,0655
1301 Vehicles and Other Parts 0,2011 0,0324
1401 Wood and Furniture 0,1141 0,0222
1501 Paper, Cellulose and Paperboard 0,1077 0,0182
1601 Rubber Products 0,1789 0,0593
1701 Non-petrochemical Chemical Elements 0,0889 0,0277
1903 Other Chemical Products 0,1400 0,0407
2001 Pharmacy Products and Perfumery 0,1166 0,0431
2101 Plastic 0,1919 0,0400
2202 Natural Textile 0,2113 0,0555
2301 Clothes 0,2575 0,0642
2603 Other Food Products 0,1572 0,0554
Notes: (1)Standard Industrial Code (three digits),(2)Parameters referring to the period of 1991-1998.
Source: Results achieved and organized by the author.
With the basic statistics of the ad valorem tariffs, summarized in Table 1, it was 
observed that the average of the sector tariffs, like: Basic Metallic Products and Non-
-Ferrous Metallic Products, would be considered as low. Sectors as Automobiles, 
Trucks and Buses, Clothes, Natural Textiles, Electrical Equipment and Electronic 
Equipment would be considered as high. By taking the standard deviation, since the 
period of 1991-1998 includes the launching process of the MERCOSUR Agreement, 
and the beginning of the deterioration of the commercial relations amongst members 
as of 1997, because of the Asian crisis, it was observed that sectors as Automobiles, 
Trucks and Buses, Rubber Products, Natural Textiles, Clothes and Other Food 
Products presented a high standard deviation in comparison to the other sectors.
Considering the references of Calfat, Ganame, and Flores (2001) and Facchini et 
al. (2010) that implied partial identification of PS Model for Argentina, Brazil, Para-
guay, and Uruguay, by the first and for Latin America and South Cone, the second 
one, is suggested that Brazilian trade policy had been established endogenously.
So, the identification of the structural parameters of the PS model, as it was 
achieved for Australia, European Union, Poland, Turkey and United States demons-
trated the endogenous perspective of the formulation of the Brazilian trade policy. 
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So, the hypothesis of the present paper is to verify if the model was suitable or not for 
the Brazilian economy in the period of 1991-1998, although the influence of trade 
agreement amongst Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
This paper uses panel data methodology that refers to multidimensional data to 
reveal the Brazilian data support to PS model framework. The dimensional perspective 
is shown by eighteen industrial sectors, by cross-section dimension, and eight years 
(1991 to 1998), by time series dimension. We added Armington’s elasticity1, which 
is time invariant. For the indicator estimation for interest group organization, we use 
random effects Tobit regression censored. In response to endogenous bias, presented 
in endogenous protection models, we use weak instruments in 2SLS for the Genera-
lized Method of Moments (GMM) and Limited Information Maximum Likelihood 
(LIML) procedures, with correction of size tests.
2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS WITH ENDOGENOUS TRADE POLICY MODELS2
Besides some theoretical empirical contributions in literature of Endogenous Trade 
Policy, only after PS model, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (1994), a new theo-
retical line of propositions, with rigorous empirical tests, corroborates endogenous 
trade policies endogenous properties.
The contributions outfitted by Grossman and Helpman’ paper (1994) considered 
the following modifications: the greater number of agents involved in the deal, the 
formulation of agreements of free trade with and without symmetry, and the parti-
cipation of foreign lobbies in the domestic scenery3. It must be included the endoge-
nous aspect of lobbies, proposed by Mitra (1999).
The pioneering characteristic of the empirical treatment, related to the PS model, 
was due to Goldberg and Maggi (1999) seminal paper. Those authors observed that 
the predictions of the PS model were consistent with the data of the North-American 
economy in 1983, identifying the structural model parameters in their original 
formulation.
Besides, they tested whether the inclusion of other variables, which were impor-
tant in ad-hoc models, affects the model explanatory power. Such variables are rele-
1 The use of the Armington’s elasticity for the PS model test was initially proposed by Gallaway, 
McDaniel, and Rivera (2003). 
2 Gawande and Krishna (2005) reviewed some empirical papers on endogenous protection, until 2001, 
without incorporating the results of Eicher and Osang (2002), Calfat, Flôres, and Ganame (2000), and 
posterior publications.
3 See Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000).
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vant to the equations of tariff and non-tariff barriers (employment rate, sectorial 
unemployment rate, unionization, changes in the import penetration and concentra-
tion of buyers and sellers, among others).
The specification was also tested for Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay 
by Calfat, Flores and Ganame (2000). Those authors concluded that the model also 
would be applicable to the MERCOSUR case, since the partial results allowed the 
identification of the correct signs for Brazil and Uruguay. It was also identified, in 
1996, the proportion of the voting population that should be represented by an inte-
rest group in Brazil and Uruguay, with parameter values of 0.67 and 0.86, respectively, 
without the identification of the weighted parameter.
The empirical strategy suggested by authors evolved a Three-Stages Leas Squares 
(3SLS) that combines 2SLS with Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). The 
problem with procedure was that authors take the SUR stage equivalent to Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS).
The heteroscedasticity were used in the same procedure as Goldberg and Maggi 
(1999). In the same way, although with the aim of measuring Latin America’s reaction 
about the increase in imports from China and India, Facchini et al. (2010) identified 
the aggregated weight well-being function to Latin America (a = 918), and South 
Cone (a = 1639). Those authors used China and India’s participation in product’s 
world trade and US capital-labor as instrumental variables. They do not presented 
any test to the quality of instruments or the correction of sample size.
Considering the partial results and procedure limitations for Calfat, Flores and 
Ganame (2000) and, also, the aggregation for Latin America and limitations of empi-
rical procedure to Facchini et al. (2010), our paper presents the identification of all 
Brazilian PS model parameters based on robust procedure.
The Eicher and Osang (2002) test, applied to the American economy in 1983, 
proved that the PS model were superior to the Tariff Formation Function model, by 
Feenstra and Bhagwati (1983).
Conventional use of the original equation also produced favorable results for 
Turkey. Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu (2002) applied the model in periods 
from 1983 to 1990, which resulted in a higher weight of the welfare function in 
democratic period, and changes in the specification of the original model allowed 
the inclusion of theoretical relevant variables. Gawande and Bandyopadhyay’s 
paper (2000), and McCalman’s paper (2004) enrolled the list of empirical papers 
for PS model.
The results demonstrated that, for the American economy, similarly to the results 
originally found by Goldberg and Maggi (1999), for 1983, the PS model presented 
results consonant to the Endogenous Trade Policy Theory.
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On the other hand, McCalman’s paper (2004), applied to Australia using the 
same method, demonstrated that, with data to the periods from 1968 to 1969, and 
from 1991 to 1992, the percentage of the voting population organized in an interest 
group increased due to the commercial liberalization, which took place in the second 
period. There was no statistically significant difference for the weight of welfare func-
tion in both periods. Bohara, Gawande, and Sanguinetti (2004) pursued to empiri-
cally identify the Argentinean and Brazilian sectors presented in the list of exceptions 
to the Common External Tariff (CET). They adapted Grossman and Helpman’s model 
(1995a, 1995b), an extension of the PS model. With information regarding to tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers, during period from the first quarter of 1992 to the fourth 
quarter of 1994, they concluded that the model was not able to explain the reason for 
the exclusion of some CET sectors.
Finally, modification presented by Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins (2006), 
applied to the data concerning USA economy, in periods of 1978-1979 and 1981-
1982, was specified to include the foreign lobbies in the protection equation of the 
PS model. The objective was to verify the influence of foreign interest groups in the 
determination of the American protection structure.
Results reveal that PS model, modified for the inclusion of external lobbies, was 
strong and statistically significant. In other words, the signs of the estimated parame-
ters were not altered with the inclusion of other variables.
The differences proposed for the empirical treatment in the present paper are 
the use of the Armington’s elasticity, as proxy of the price elasticities in demands for 
imports; the specification of instrumental variables compatible with sectorial struc-
tures and conjunctures; the use of panel data techniques for a period of eight years, 
aiming at the capture of the inter- and intra-sectorial dynamic effects in the time 
interval studied and, since PS model structure is a balance result, statistical signifi-
cance reveals consistency; and, finally, the use of tariff aliquots, which would origi-
nally be represented in the PS model.
Estimation procedures used were the GMM and the LIML. The advantage of the 
first would be the achievement of better results when the procedures of maximum 
likelihood require nonlinear optimization; the advantage of the second would be the 
fact that the use of weak instrumental variables could cause bias, mainly when their 
number varied according to the sample size. The second procedure would repre-
sent an innovation, in comparison to the other estimates limited in LIML procedure 
with sample correction for weak instruments. Our contribution managed structural 
specification for price import elasticity used in the left-hand side or in the right-hand 
side of equation. Also, in the use of instrumental variables, we detailed the tech-
nique for the quality of instruments, and the sample size correction for the tests on 
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instruments to control the bias of endogenous aspect. Finally, we managed the 
problems of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
3. METHODOLOGY
The methodology was based on the use of panel data techniques with the specifica-
tion of instrumental variables, for the elimination of the endogenous bias presented 
in such models, as proposed by Trefler (1993). Estimates were applied for the data 
concerning Brazilian economy, in period from 1991 to 1998, comprising the commer-
cial openness, started in 1991, the admission of the country in the MERCOSUR in 
1995, and the beginning of its collapse in the end of 1998.
3.1 THE EMPIRICAL MODEL TESTED
The basic model developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994) considers an objective 
function of an incumbent government given by:
  
( ) ( )h
h L
G C p aW p
∈
= +∑  (1)
in which:
C = campaign contributions;
L = sectors organized in interest groups;
h = h–th activity sector;
a = weight of the welfare function;
W = welfare function; 
p = price vector.
The government objective-function demonstrated to be additive to the resources 
from contributions of interest groups and some weight of the welfare function.
The public welfare function W(p) would represent the sum of these functions to the 
results of each of the i–th sectors of the economic activity, according to the identity (2):
 ( ) ( )1
n
ii
W p W p
=
= ∑  (2)
in which:
n = number of activity sectors.
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The structure of protection is derived from a menu-auction problem, or a two-stage 
game, in which sectors contributions through lobbies are limited to a feasible set. Based 
on contributions, government established the optimal trade policy with maximization 
of his objective function. As this game is repeated, the strategic contributions forced 
government to best choices to lobbies as a Truthful Nash Equilibria, as equation (3) 
described:
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,j j ii LW p C p C p a W p j L∈∇ − ∇ + ∇ + ∇ = ∀ ∈∑  (3)
Solving the problem for (3), based on equations (1) and (2), generates equation (4).
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* ' * ' 0j L j j L j j j j j j j jI y p p p m p a p p m pα α −− + − + =  (4)
By rearranging equation (4), and solving it for τi = (pi – pi*)/pi*, result the expres-
sion (5), plus an index for specification to time:
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= =  + +  
 (5)
in which:
y = tariff relation;
τ = ad valorem import tariff;
z = inverse import penetration;
I = interest group representation indicator;
e = price–elasticity of the demand for imports;
i = activity sector, i = 1, ...., n; and
t = time unit, t = 1991, ...., 1998.
3.2 ECONOMETRIC MODEL: THE PANEL DATA METHOD
The panel data structure presents countless advantages over the simultaneous equation 
systems, the cross-section, and time series structures, according to Greene’ propositions 
(1997), as general reference; (Hsiao, 1999; Lee, 2002; Wooldridge, 2002; Arellano, 
2003; and Baltagi, 2005), as specific references, on panel data literature. Among the 
advantages, it is worth pointing out that the method allowed the individual hetero-
geneity identification, presented in several data structures, being more informative 
when presenting more variability, more degrees of freedom, more efficiency and less 
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collinearity among variables, and the possibility of interaction between cross-sections 
and time units of those sets, significant to the study of dynamic adjustment.
The inferences on the model results would be done based on the estimations 
of equations (6) and (7), written with the price elasticity of demand for imports in 
first member, Model 1, or with the price elasticity of demand for imports in second 
member, Model 2, namely:
 1
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z = inverse import penetration;
υ = random residuals to measure random effects; 
m = deterministic residuals to measure fixed effects.
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Some problems appear in estimation process for PS model. So, an empirical stra-
tegy must nullify them.
3.3 DATA TREATMENT AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
In the verification of the endogenous aspect of the Brazilian trade policy, two econo-
metric difficulties were found. The first econometric difficulty was the specification 
of the dummy variable to the organization in industrial sectors.
Empirical strategy is diverse, covering since the structure of equation to be esti-
mated to the estimation method used. All the estimation process also involved the 
identification of interest group organization indicator and the treatment of endoge-
nous bias caused by the tariffs effects on price import elasticity.
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The empirical literature presented some alternatives to estimate the organization’s 
indicator in interest group. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) tried a double censored Tobit 
model using non-trade barriers. That proposal was followed by other authors, such as 
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu (2002), Eicher 
and Osang (2002), McCalman (2004), and Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins (2006).
Beloc and Guerrieri (2008) used an arbitrary level of 70% to characterize an orga-
nized sector in a probit model. Likewise Hagemejer and Michalek (2008) used the 
sample mean to identify an organized sector, but without an estimation process. 
A discriminant analysis was used by Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu (2002) and 
Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu (2006).
In the present work, sectors that presented a concentration index, for hypothesis, 




it it iI w β ϕ= +  (8)
in which:
0
itI  = interest group indicator;
wit = vector of independent variables;
β = vector of coefficients; and
ϕi = random effect.
The set of independent variables corresponds to inverse import penetration 
(zit) industrial concentration index (iciit), number of firms (ne500it), employment 
turnover rate (treit), export annual coefficients (caeit), annual coefficients of net 
openness (caalit) and annual coefficients of imported input participation (capiiit), real 
wage per worker (wit) sectorial employment (lit), increase in sales (cvit), general liqui-
dity (lgit), industrial physical production index (ipfiit), and imports (mit), all of them 
presented in the Appendix.
For intervals to the estimation of censored Tobit model5, we have: left side corres-
ponding to non-organized sectors, inferior to “a” level, and right side, the organized 
sectors, corresponding to level superior to “b”. The estimation results are showed on 
Table 2.
4 Basic statistics to 18 sectors, from 1991-1998, shows the mean of 14.51%, and standard-deviation of 
6.72% in tariffs. The minimum ad valorem tariff was 2.2% and maximum was 37.6%. So, the choice of 
10% corresponds to two units of standard-deviation in an asymmetric distribution frequency. 
5 The specification requires the joint density of censored Tobit Model, the observed data in panel data, 
unconditional of ϕi. 
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Table 2 – Tobit censored specification




























































Notes: (*)10% of significance; (**)5% of significance; (***)1% of significance;  
(NS)non-significant; (  ) = standard errors.
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The second problem was the endogenous bias presented in endogenous protec-
tion models, defined as the inverse import penetration as an explanatory variable, as 
well as the price import elasticity.
From empirical literature, differences amongst alternatives were identified in the 
estimation process with Maximum Likelihood for Goldberg and Maggi (1999), and 
Hagemejer and Michalek (2008); Two Stage Least Square for Gawande and Bandyo-
padhyay (2000), McCalman (2004), and Belloc and Gerrieri (2008); Minimum 
Distance Estimator for Eicher and Osang (2002); Non-Linear Two Stage Least Square 
Estimation for Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu (2002), and Gawande, Krishna, and 
Robbins (2006); Non-Linear Tobit Limited Information Maximum Likelihood for 
Gawande and Li (2009).
The strategy to treat price import elasticity endogenous was solved using the 
elasticity variable in the left-hand side of equation. Strategy was proposed by Goldberg 
and Maggi (1999), and followed by Eicher and Osang (2002), and McCalman (2004). 
Differently, this paper considered the both structures with elasticity in the left-hand 
side, as equation (6), and in the right-hand side, as equation (7).
Besides the elasticity measurement error problem, due to empirical data set that 
corresponds to a single year, in the case of Goldbeg and Maggi (1999) and Eicher and 
Osang (2002), this paper used a larger dataset in which elasticity measurement errors 
should be less intensive compared to a single year. Moreover, Armington’s elasticities, 
time invariant, can do better that price import elasticities.
Likewise when you used the price import elasticities in the left-hand side of equa-
tion or in the right-hand side, endogenous bias should appear either with tariff effects 
on domestic production, as a small open country model, or with tariff effects on 
imports, and consequently on inverse import penetration.
A generalized solution is based on instrumental variables referring to an esti-
mation technique used to a variety of violations including measurement error, 
simultaneity, and omitted variables. Two-Stages Least Squares (2SLS) is gene-
rally used as a standard technique. Exception is attributed to Mitra, Thomakos 
and Ulubasoglu (2004) that used Weighted Two-Stages Least Square (W2SLS) to 
manage the endogenous aspect, measurement error problem, and heteroscedas-
ticity problem.
Instrumental variables were used by Eicher and Osang (2002), McCalman (2004), 
Hagemejer and Michalek (2008), Belloc and Gerrieri (2008), and also Gawande and 
Li (2009). The main problem with procedure is the quality of used instruments. In 
empirical literature, some tests are used to corroborate the instrumented variables, 
but in Gawande and Li (2009), difficulties with small-sample properties were solved 
using Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML).
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Generally, the advantage of 2SLS is an instrumental variable estimation technique 
that is formally equivalent in linear case, referring this paper. Although, even in an 
applied instrumental variables procedures to eliminated endogenous bias, another 
problem appears in instruments’ quality, namely, weak instruments.
In the estimation procedures, we used the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM)6 that allows the achievement of estimated parameters, when the maximum 
likelihood requires the non-linear optimization, which is observed in procedures 
with instrumental variables. The procedure covers the proposal of Mitra, Thomakos, 
and Ulubasoglu (2002), and Gawande, Krishna and Robbins (2006). To corroborate 
the results with this procedure, tests were necessary, since weak instruments cause 
bias, according to Baltagi (2003).
Classical and robust standard errors are obtained for arbitrary heteroscedasticity 
to 2SLS instrumental variables procedure in GMM estimation. For Arellano (2002), 
Sargan’s test is a test of the validity for instrumental variables, basically over identifi-
cation restrictions.
Using weak instruments in procedure, we need Sargan’s test for Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM). So, using instrumental variables is necessary to test 
the hypothesis requiring correct size when instruments are weak as well as strong7.
Now, the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood procedures (LIML) present 
advantages in comparison to the other methods, mainly when the number of instru-
ments varies in relation to the sample size. Besides, the results of the Monte Carlo 
simulation showed that the LIML method presents consistent results, even when the 
instruments are weak, which happened in the analysis, according to Baltagi (2003).
Using weak instruments in LIML procedure requires Anderson-Rubin test (AR), 
as a test of structural parameters. Also, Lagrange multiplier test (LM) called score 
test. Recently, Moreira (2003) proposed the Conditional Likelihood Ratio (CLR) test, 
evaluating tests in the presence of weak instruments8.
For identification of instruments, according to Greene (1997), it was necessary to 
adjust the choice of the instruments and the procedure that comprises the following:
• Estimation of the original equation and residuals capture;
• Estimation of a regression between residuals and several potential instru-
ments, including a constant, a trend variable, the lagged dependent varia-
bles and the lagged explanatory variables. The non-significant parameters 
6 To GMM procedure with weak instruments, see Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2003).
7 See Moreira (2003).
8 To the tests, we need to specify the Q matrix as proposed by Mikusheva and Poi (2001). 
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were potential instruments, because they did not present correlation with 
residuals;
• Estimation of the explanatory variables according to the instruments, 
where the significant parameters were potential instruments, provided that 
they had not been significant in the previous procedure.
In the procedure, the weak and strong instruments used in the two-stage proce-
dure were selected. The weak instruments were the non-significant ones for equation 
of the residuals and weakly correlated with endogenous explanatory variables, while 
the strong or consistent instruments were the non-significant for residues and corre-
lated with the endogenous explanatory variable.
Finally, to verify the procedure consistency, the regression residues were regressed 
in two stages, according to the instruments; the non-significance of the parameters 
proved that the residues are consistent.
The advantages of this paper over general literature are (i) it manages the price 
import elasticity using the both specification for Model 1 and Model 2; (ii) it consi-
dered the Armington’s import elasticity that is time invariant; (iii) the quality of 
instruments were checked out with a rigorous procedure that determines weak and 
strong instruments that not appears in other related papers; (iv) even using weak 
or strong instruments, the Sargan’s test to overidentification of restrictions was 
executed; (v) the used alternative of GMM and FIML, the first based in the non-
-linear optimization estimation process attributable to the use of instrumental varia-
bles, the last based on the variable number of instruments; (vi) the Anderson-Rubin 
test, Lagrange multiplier test, and conditional likelihood ratio test in the presence of 
weak instruments in the use of LIML procedure; (vii) the procedure were robust to 
autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, or both.
Specifically for Brazilian estimation or aggregated results for Latin America, this 
paper presented all advantages summarized above.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The procedures to reach PS model parameters, as presented in previous section, were 
based on the estimation of original equation, corresponding to the equations speci-
fied as equation (6), as Model 1, and equation (7), as Model 2.
The first step of empirical strategy evolves the estimation of indicator variable for 
sectors organized on interest groups. Through the observation of Table 2, implied 
that censoring the data for ad valorem import tariffs, in right at level superior to 0.2, 
and in left at level or inferior to 0.1, for a random effects, Tobit regression results in 
23 observations right censored.
 JUNIOR, S. E. G. – Brazilian Endogenous Trade Policy: 1991 - 1998 499 
Then, in second step, as implied in Table 3, the residuals estimated were, then, 
regressed according to the instruments presented in groups of section 3.3, with addi-
tion of the lagged dependent variable, and the lagged of endogenous variables, as 
suggested by Greene (1997). Then, the endogenous variable is regressed (only the 
inverse of import penetration) according to the variables of the previous regression, 
as showed on Table 3.
Table 3 – Instruments identification – maximum likelihood method
Dep. Variable:
Model 1 Model 2
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Table 3 – Instruments identification – maximum likelihood method
Dep. Variable:
Model 1 Model 2










R2 – within 0.5866 0.7265 0.709 0.641
R2 – between 0.9437 0.962 0.986 0.9903
R2 – overall 0.7352 0.869 0.8503 0.8803
Wald χ2 (k) 271.06*** 442.97*** 618.89*** 801.42***
σu 0.00262939 6.275 0 0
σe 0.01276545 11.174 0.00834 6.8233
ρ 0.04069975 0.239741 0 0
strong instruments 0itÎ zit(–1) and treit empty set
weak instruments
yit (–1), wpit, iciit, ne500it, caeit, capiiit, caalit, 
and ipfiit
yit (–1), wpit, ne500it, caalit, ipfiit, and treit
Weight ipfiit ipfiit
Notes: (*)10% of significance; (**)5% of significance; (***)1% of significance; (NS)non-significant; ( ) = standard errors.
Through the observation of the parameter significance, the following initial 
results were found: (a) Model 1: weak instruments9 (yit (–1), wpit, iciit, ne500it, caeit, 
capiiit, caalit, and ipfiit) and strong instruments10 (zit(–1) and treit); and (b) Model 2: 
weak instruments (yit(–1), wpit, ne500it, caalit, ipfiit,, and treit) and no strong instru-
ments. To these instruments, an intercept variable and a trend variable, which refers 
to the years from 1991 to 1998, may be added.
Then, the results for Model 1 and Model 2, using the GMM and LIML methods, 
were summarized in Table 4 (GMM) and Table 5 (LIML).
9 It can be seen that the variables considered weak instruments were those which simultaneously presented 
no correlation with the residuals and weak correlation with the endogenous explanatory variables.
10 The consistent instruments presented non-significance in the residuals regression and were statistically 
significant in the regression of the endogenous explanatory variable.
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year, 0itÎ zit(–1), treit, yit(–1), 
wpit, iciit, ne500it, caeit, capiiit, 
caalit, and ipfiit
Instrument Variables
wpit, ne500it, caalit, ipfiit, 
and treit
Instrumented Variables 0itÎ zit and zit Instrumented Variables 0itÎ zit and zit
n. observations 144 n. observations 144
F(2, 141) 3.09** F(2, 141) 1.93NS
SQ Residuals 11.674 SQ Residuals 0.30332
SQ Centered Residuals 9.4585 SQ Centered Residuals 0.336724
R2 Centered –0.2343 R2 Centered 0.0992
Sargan’s Statistics 29χ 26.594*** Sargan’s Statistics 23χ 13.252***
Standard errors robust in the presence of arbitrary
heteroscedasticity.
Standard errors robust in the presence of arbitrary
heteroscedasticity.
Notes: (*)10% of significance; (**)5% of significance; (***)1% of significance; (NS)non-significant. The statistics are 
consistent with autocorrelation. The GMM method involved the correction of the heteroscedasticity for the weight 
alternative that took into account the square root of the variance of ipfi variable.
Source: Results achieved by the author using Stata Program.
In the basic results corresponding to Table 4, GMM method indicates the significant 
representation to Model 1. Exceptions could be ascribed to the signal of the centered 
R2. However, Stata procedures show that their negative values did not hinder the infe-
rences about the regression parameters (Sribney, Wiggins, and Drukker, 2003)11.
Sargan’s statistics (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 123; Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman, 2003, 
p. 17), evidenced the overidentification of the instruments, specifying that, under 
the null hypothesis, the set of instruments excluded would be valid, besides the non-
-correlation with residuals for strong instruments. According to the test, the set of 
instruments are valid, even the correct size is required when they are weak or strong. 
The Model 2 F-test rejects the structure based on original purpose with the elasticity 
on second equation member.
11 StataCorp (2005).
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Structural parameters estimated, through the significance of gamma and delta 
parameters, which correspond to both variables (inverse import penetration and 
inverse import penetration by the organization of an interest group), result in the 
part of population represented by an interest group, aL = 0.21, and the weight of the 
welfare function, a = 9.09.
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itÎ zit(–1), treit, yit (–1), wpit, 
iciit, ne500it, caeit, capiiit, 
caalit, zit, and ipfiit
Instrumental
Variables
 treit, yit(–1), ne500it, caalit, 
0






n. observations 126 n. observations 126
F(2, 123) 1.98NS F(2, 123) 6.88***
SQ Residuals 84.915 SQ Residuals 1.72536
SQ Cent. Residuals 7.7842 SQ Cent. Residuals 0.242238
R2 Centered –9.9087 R2 Centered –6.1226
H0:_b[zit] –0.33392 H0:_b[zit] –0.018963
Anderson-Rubin = 
2














k = 1.22152; λ = 1.24784 e Fuller (#) = 3 k = 1.09094; λ = 1.09941 and Fuller (#) = 1
Note: (*)10% of significance; (**)5% of significance; (***)1% of significance; (NS)non-significant. The statistics are 
consistent with autocorrelation.
Source: Results achieved by the author using Stata program version 9.
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The basic results corresponding to Table 5, now for LIML method, result in the 
significance for Model 2, and no significance for Model 1. On the LIML method, 
results were more robust, since the procedure allows the inclusion of weak instru-
ments, without causing bias in the estimated parameters (Cruz and Moreira, 2005). 
The basic statistics for the use of weak instruments is given by Anderson-Rubin test, 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) – score test, and conditional probability of CLR statistical 
that provides the correct sizes for parameters.
The Anderson-Rubin test, a chi-squared test with 5 degrees of freedom, with 
statistics consistent with autocorrelation produces an instrumented variable coeffi-
cient equal to –0.018963. For LM or score test, the results confirm the parameter for 
the inverse import penetration relation.
Finally, the conditional probability of CLR statistical, for a = 0.1, results in a signi-
ficant parameter for delta equal to –0.018963. Combining results for both structural 
parameters, we achieved part of population represented by an interest group, aL = 0.19, 
and the weight of the welfare function, a = 10.
In synthesis, the estimations procedures result in adequacy of Model 1 for Brazi-
lian economy estimated by GMM method, and Model 2 by LIML method. It provides 
the adequacy of the model to the Brazilian economy data for the period of 1991-
1998, since the parameters αL (referring to the part of the voting population repre-
sented by an interest group), and the parameter a (which indicates the weight that 
the government attributes to the welfare function) corroborated for the endogenous 
protection hypotheses suggested by Calfat, Flores and Ganame (2000), related to the 
presence of interest groups in the formulation of the Brazilian trade policy.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The extent of empirical results linked to the proposal of endogenous protection in 
the trade policy was motivated in the beginning of the 90’s by the series of struc-
tured works with the use of the Game Theory by Grossman and Helpman (1994). As 
a result, the contributions of those authors became an important paradigmatic mark 
of the international economy literature, as well as the empirical results achieved from 
the econometric works based on their parsimonious structure.
Based on a robust empirical estimation techniques, adding Armington’s elasticity, 
time invariant, the estimation of Tobit censoring for indicator of interest group orga-
nization in industrial sectors, instrumental variables to correct the endogenous bias, 
present in the endogenous protection models, including GMM and LIML methods 
in 2SLS procedure for use of weak instruments with corrections of size tests, we 
conclude that political economy of Brazil’s trade policy verified Grossman-Helpman 
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model adequacy based in the identification of structural parameters for Protection 
for Sale Model.
Table 6 – Comparative results with the empirical literature







European Union 2001 82.61 0.73
Poland 1996-1999 8332.67 0.67
Turkey mean (1983, 1984, 1988, 1990) 84.23 0.60
United States 1983 61.19 0.88
Source: McCalman (2004); GMM-Model 1; LIML-Model 2; Belloc and Gerrieri (2008); Hagemejer and Michalek (2008); 
Mitra, Thomakos, and Ulubasoglu. (2002); Goldberg and Maggi (1999).
Once Brazilian trade policy supported results to PS model, a benchmark, based 
on results for Australia, European Union, Poland, Turkey, and United States, give us 
support to international comparisons for new results from empirical literature.
For international comparisons to the results of empirical literature – see Table 6, 
the parameters, besides the significance of structural parameters – Brazilian economy 
produces an outlier, as well as a Poland economy. Based on Mitra, Thomakos and Uluba-
soglu (2006), searching for realistic parameters, they identified the opposite relation 
between both PS model parameters that implies highaL and low a, or lowaL and high a.
The Brazilian results indicate low aL and low a, and Poland results indicates 
aL, following international tendency combined with an expressive a level, causing 
another outlier.
Although the results were significant for a parsimonious model, in comparison 
to the ad hoc structures in force in literature between the 60’s and the 90’s, the empi-
rical evidence demanded a considerable econometric effort, in comparison to the ad 
hoc structures. Besides, there may be some questioning for the theoretical model and 
application in the Brazilian economy.
The basic question refers to the relation between the parameters αL and a, which, 
apparently, present an inverse relation, when partial results of countless estimates 
are observed. To explain the outlier results, we suggest the inclusion of exchange rate 
regime in the PS model12. Partial derivative for the ad valorem tariff against nominal 
12 pi = pi* (1+τi ), pi* = r i*E, r i* = international prices in foreign currency; E = exchange rate expressing 
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency; pi* = foreign prices in terms of domestic currency.
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exchange rate results in 0E







. A higher difference between 
domestic and foreign prices, that includes exchange rate level causes a low aL and low 
a for Brazilian’s parameters.
As appointed by Baer, Cavalcanti, and Silva (2002), two channels are considered 
for exporters and importers in South America in the beginning of 90’s – exchange 
rate volatilities chanel and lobbying channel that determinates the level of protection 
to domestic goods.
In this point of view, we consider the result as an outlier for Brazilian economy as 
a consequence of endogenous trade policy mixed with exchange rate policy.
This paper provided many advantages amongst other papers, mainly in empirical 
strategy and econometric procedure used. The quality of instruments were checked 
out with a rigorous procedure that determines weak and strong instruments, included 
Sargan’s test to overidentification restrictions, the Anderson-Rubin test, Lagrange 
multiplier test, and conditional likelihood ratio test in the presence of weak instru-
ments, using GMM and LIML procedure. Finally, robustness was used to autocorrela-
tion, heteroscedasticity, or both.
In spite of the doubts concerning the streamline of the research on endogenous 
protection, it can be concluded that Brazilian economy has suffered influence of inte-
rest groups in the determination of the level of tariff coverage imposed by the central 
government, according to what can be observed during 1991-1998, based on the 
Grossman and Helpman (1994) model structure.
APPENDIX
One of the main difficulties for the econometric tests of this subject was the avai-
lability of statistical information, aggregated in a way to enable inferences on the 
subject. So, efforts were made to offer the widest set of information to establish a 
credible basis for the endogenous protection test applied to the Brazilian economy.
The information represented a set of sectorial disaggregated variables, at level 80 
in statistics of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), compatible 
with the SIC-3 digit level. Part of the information was taken from secondary bases 
already mentioned, or those elaborated by the author, such as the industrial concen-
tration index, with the need to make it compatible with the specification of level 80.
The statistics made available as follow:
•	 Tariff in Relation: yit = τit/(1 + τit) – comprises the level of domestic protec-
tion for the sectors specified in Table 3. This information was originally 
constructed by Kume, Piani, and Bráz de Souza (2000), and made available 
by Muendler (2001a);
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•	 Inverse Import Penetration (zit) – shows the relation between imports and the 
domestic production. The statistics were elaborated by Ramos (1999), and 
Ramos and Zonenschein (2000), and made available by Muendler (2001b);
•	 Armington Elasticity (eai) – proxies of the true elasticities. By defini-
tion, the Armington elasticity reflects the degree of replacement between 
the domestic and imported goods. Thus, such elasticities would take into 
account the changes in the relative prices, attributable to tariff changes. The 
data was achieved from the paper of Tourinho, Kume, and Pedroso (2002);
•	 Industrial Concentration Index (iciit) – based on Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI), (Source: Revista Exame Maiores e Melhores – several issues). 
The data was available for the years of 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 
1997, and 1998. So, the data referring to 1991 refers to the year of 1990;
•	 Number of Firms (ne500it) – number of companies in the sector among 500 
main companies. The criterion is based on the main variables and indicators 
selected by the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) – Source: Revista Conjun-
tura Econômica – As 500 Maiores Empresas do Brasil;
•	 Wage Premium13 (wpit) – the wage premium is a variable ascribed to the 
workers’ industrial affiliation. In other words, it depends on the sector in 
that the individual works. Industrial affiliation is important in the evalua-
tion of the effects for commercial openness, or block formation, on the 
workers’ wage in models of short and medium term, and imperfect compe-
tition. This variable was made compatible for eighteen out of the fifty sectors 
presented in Table 1;
•	 Employment Turnover Rate (treit) – monthly employment turnover rate. Use 
of data referring to December of each year. (Source: IBGE – Monthly Indus-
trial Research – General Data);
•	 Export Annual Coefficients (caeit) – comprise the division of the exported 
value by the domestic production value (Ribeiro and Pourchet, 2002:12) – 
Nota Técnica FUNCEX;
•	 Liquid Openness Annual Coefficients (caalit) – difference between the export 
coefficient and the imported input coefficient (Ribeiro and Pourchet, 
2002:12) – Nota Técnica FUNCEX;
13 The data was taken from Table 4 of Pavcnik et al. (2004), so insignificant values were taken as zero.
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•	 Annual Coefficients of Imported Input Participation (capiiit) – division of 
the imported inputs used in production by the domestic production value 
(Ribeiro and Pourchet, 2002:12) – Nota Técnica FUNCEX;
•	 Real Wage per Worker (wit) – real payroll per worker per kind of index, and 
genders of the transformation industry – Fixed Base 1985 = 100. Source: 
IBGE – Monthly Industrial Research – General Data;
•	 Sectorial Employment (lit) – statistics of this variable were taken from the 
Statistical Yearbook at www.midc.gov.br. With such information, the 
problem with the lack of data availability referring to 1991 was solved by the 
estimation based on the variation of the industry employment level in1992;
•	 Increase in Sales (cvit) – index with fixed basis 1990 = 100. The data was 
found in the Revista Exame – Maiores e Melhores, several issues;
•	 General Liquidity (lgit) – long term receivables over the liabilities. From 
1995, the concept made available by the Exame Magazine was that of 
“Current Liquidity”, which results from the relation between the “Assets” 
and the “Liabilities”;
•	 Industrial Physical Production Index (ipfiit) – index of the monthly physical 
production per index, and type of transformation industry with monthly 
fixed basis and annual adjustment, average of 1991 = 100. (Source: IBGE – 
Monthly Industrial Production – Physical Production);
•	 Imports (mit) – value of imports in US$ thousands. This variable was 
available at www.ipeadata.gov.br.
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